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Findings about cognitive bias drawn from behavioral science
have been used to justify rejecting stare decisis, changing
consumer credit laws, regulating performance-enhancing drugs,
revising the doctrine of fiduciary responsibility, and ceasing to
treat some juvenile convictions as "strikes" under a "three strikes"
law.' These arguments share a structure in common:
1. Before considering evidence from behavioral science, we
endorse some legal norm.
2. Evidence from behavioral science shows that this legal
norm involves, or is influenced by, certain cognitive
processes, which we call biases.
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1. See People v. Smith, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d 901, 926 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (Johnson,
J., dissenting) (arguing that because "'judges are more likely than juries to develop
cognitive biases favoring police at the expense of defendants,'" juvenile
adjudications without the opportunity for a jury trial should not be treated as
"strikes" under California's "three strikes" law (quoting Recent Case: United States
v. Smalley, 116 HARV. L. REV. 705, 709 (2002))); Gregory S. Alexander, A Cognitive
Theory of Fiduciary Relationships, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 769 (2000) (arguing
that evidence about cognitive bias gives us reason to re-examine how judges
approach the special responsibility of fiduciaries); Goutam U. Jois, Stare Decisis Is
Cognitive Error, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 63, 64-65 (2009) (arguing that evidence about
cognitive bias gives us reason to reject stare decisis); see also Nathalie Martin &
Ocean Tama y Sweet, Mind Games: Rethinking BAPCPA's Debtor Education
Provisions, 31 S. ILL. U. L.J. 517, 519 (2007) (arguing that evidence about cognitive
bias affects which consumer credit laws we should adopt); Gregory Mitchell, Taking
Behavioralism Too Seriously? The Unwarranted Pessimism of the New Behavioral
Analysis of Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1907, 1907 (2002) (reviewing proposals for
policy change in light of cognitive bias); Joshua H. Whitman, Winning at All Costs:
Using Law & Economics to Determine the Proper Role of Government in Regulating
the Use of Performance-Enhancing Drugs in Professional Sports, 2008 U. ILL. L.
REV. 459, 470 (2008) (arguing that cognitive bias should play a part in choices
about regulations on performance-enhancing drugs).
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3. The effect of biases on the legal norm in question justifies
rejecting the norm and adopting an alternative that
avoids or minimizes their effect.
A parallel form of argument reaches an opposite conclusion: that
the involvement or influence of certain cognitive processes (often
dubbed heuristics rather than biases) supports a legal norm.'
This Article advances the discussion of cognitive bias's
relevance to law in two ways. The first is clarifying. Part I
differentiates descriptive definitions of bias (which do not support
treating biases as objectionable influences on law) from
prescriptive definitions (which do). Part II similarly distinguishes
statistical significance from effect size and argues that neither
statistical significance nor effect size entails the legal relevance of
a bias.
The second way it advances this discussion is substantive.
Part III begins by contending that establishing a given bias's
relevance to law requires making explicit the normative stance
that establishes the bias's relevance. Much existing legal
literature on cognitive heuristics and biases wrongly slides from
(1) the claim that some bias influences a norm to (2) the claim that
the norm should be rejected or accepted. If my argument is
correct, the influence of cognitive heuristics and biases on a legal
norm neither justifies automatically rejecting nor automatically
endorsing that norm. Rather, the evaluation of legal norms in
light of their associated biases must proceed case by case. I
continue in Parts III and IV by considering whether the effect of
some prominent cognitive biases-such as the endowment effect
and availability heuristic-on a given legal norm justifies
changing that norm.
This Article differs substantially in aim and methodology
from existing critical scholarship examining the significance of
cognitive bias to law. Legal commentators with training in
psychology have alleged that methodological flaws in behavioral
scientific research on cognitive bias undermine the legal relevance
2. See Craig S. Lerner, Reasonable Suspicion and Mere Hunches, 59 VAND. L.
REV. 407, 410 (2006) (discussing the work of German cognitive psychologist Gerd
Gigerenzer and noting that "Gigerenzer's provocative claim is not simply that the
'fast and frugal heuristic' is an alternative way of thinking but that it is often
preferable: one can generate better results by stripping out many variables and
acting quickly and on less information."); see also GERD GIGERENZER & PETER M.
TODD, SIMPLE HEuRIsTIcs THAT MAKE Us SMART 6 (1999) (presenting an overview
of heuristics research).
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of this research.! My critique of case law and legal scholarship
that employ research on cognitive bias is different. My claim is
that even if research on cognitive bias were technically exemplary,
it still could not, on its own, justify changes in legal norms. The
legal relevance of cognitive bias requires support from an
argument that experimental subjects' divergence from certain
models of behavior (for instance, rational-choice economic models)
constitutes a normative mistake rather than a normatively
defensible deviation from an empirical prediction.4
I. Prescriptive and Descriptive Definitions of Bias
At its best, scholarship in psychology is insightful and
circumspect about definitions of bias and their implications for
policy. The psychologist David Funder, for instance, notes that
psychological studies frequently use the term "error" in a technical
sense-without intended negative connotations-to simply
indicate subjects' deviation from the experimenter's predicted
model of behavior.' A research subject's committing an "error" in
this technical sense does not constitute her doing anything she
normatively ought not do.6 Indeed, subjects "err" in this sense
3. See Mitchell, supra note 1, at 1945-95 (criticizing the experimental design
and scientific validity of psychological research on cognitive bias). For a skeptical
perspective on Mitchell's approach, see David A. Hoffman, How Relevant is Jury
Rationality?, 2003 U. ILL. L. REv. 507, 528 (reviewing CASS SUNSTEIN ET AL.,
PUNITIvE DAMAGES: How JURIES DECIDE (2002)) ("[DIebating whether people are or
are not irrational, do or do not provide perfectly predictable punitive verdicts,
respect or disrespect jury instructions, in the context of deciding how much power
they ought to retain over legal institutions, is likely to prove an ineffective
rejoinder to the new paternalism.").
4. Cf. David C. Funder, Errors and Mistakes: Evaluating the Accuracy of
Social Judgment, 101 PSYCHOL. BULL. 75, 77 (1987) (noting the distinction, and
unjustified slippage between "models ... viewed . .. as theories of how people do
make judgments" and models viewed "as standards prescribing how people should
make judgments").
5. Id. at 78 ("Like so many other common words ... that psychological jargon
has borrowed from ordinary English, the word error appears deceptively simple,
because its psychological usage is different. In psychology, proper use of the term
is technical, not evaluative. . . . The distinction between the two usages is nicely
demonstrated in Funk & Wagnall's Standard College Dictionary. . . , in which the
first definition of error is '[slomething done, said or believed incorrectly; a mistake.'
The technical sense is in the fifth definition: '[t]he difference between the observed
value of a magnitude and the true or mean value.' (Of course in this context 'true'
also has a technical meaning.) Errors demonstrated in the laboratory have this
second meaning; they represent departures from the experimenter's standard for a
'true' response that directly reflects the stimulus. Yet even some psychologists
seem to be less aware than they should be of the subtle difference between this sort
of error and a mistake.") (citation omitted).
6. Id. at 75 ("Laboratory research on 'error' in social judgment has largely
supplanted research that addresses accuracy issues more directly. Moreover, this
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even when they deviate from a normatively unappealing model.'
And designing a model with unquestioned normative appeal can
be very challenging when dealing with contested social and
political judgments.'
Funder also makes an observation that is particularly
apposite to the application of behavioral science to law. For a
model of human behavior to justify a claim about what legal norms
we should adopt, it must be coupled with claims about how
humans ought to behave. Yet, as Funder observes, psychologists'
models of behavior were historically descriptive (describing what
subjects in fact do), not prescriptive (proposing what subjects ought
to do).' As such, Funder sees psychologists' normative criticism of
research attracts a great deal of attention because of what many take to be its
dismal implications for the accuracy of human social reasoning. These implications
are illusory, however, because an error is not the same thing as a 'mistake.' An
error is a judgment of an experimental stimulus that departs from a model of the
judgment process. If this model is normative, then the error can be said to represent
an incorrect judgment.") (emphasis added).
7. Id. at 76 n.2 ("Strictly speaking, any departure of the subject's judgment
from the model being tested is an 'error' even if the model postulates a gravely
flawed or irrational judgment process. In such situations the nonevaluative,
technical meaning of the term error becomes clear.").
8. Id. at 76-77 ("When the study is of social judgment, the topic of this article,
the criterion problem becomes even stickier. The complexity of most social
situations makes any degree of certainty and precision in the establishment of
'truth' difficult to come by, and the necessary assumptions are difficult to
formulate, much less confirm. If a subject claims that someone is 'friendly' or
'competent' on the basis of his or her acquaintance with that person, for example,
on what grounds can we assess whether the subject is right or wrong?"); see also
Robert J. MacCoun, Epistemological Dilemmas in the Assessment of Legal Decision
Making, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 723, 725-26 (1999) (describing the
"correspondence approach," on which "bias or error is established directly by
measuring the discrepancy between the judgment and the true state being judged,"
and noting that "[t]his logic has been quite fruitful in psychophysics, but perhaps
less so in social psychology, where we often lack objective measures of the 'true'
state of the sociopolitical environment. . . . [T]he question is whether we can ground
our evaluations in some objective standards for accuracy.").
9. Funder, supra note 4, at 77 (Research on the process of social judgment
"does not and was never originally intended to address the external validity or
accuracy of personality judgment.... [Ain interesting thing happened when
psychologists began conducting empirical, process-oriented research based on
idealized, normative models .... Gradually ... it became apparent that actual
human judgment often deviates from [psychologists'] prescriptions....
Simultaneously, these models came to be viewed less as theories of how people do
make judgments and more as standards prescribing how people should make
judgments. As a result, any departure from these models or, more generally, any
transformation, biased recall, or other distortion of experimental stimuli began to
be taken as an 'error,' or even less ambiguously, a 'shortcoming' or 'fallacy.'"); see
also Douglas A. Kysar, The Jurisprudence of Experimental Law and Economics,
163 J. INSTITUTIONAL & Ti-iEoRETIcAL ECON. 187, 195 (2007) ("For Kahneman and
Tversky, the study of cognitive biases therefore was much like the study of optical
illusions: [bly examining ways in which unobservable processes such as cognition
34 [Vol. 32:31
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the "fundamental attribution error," for example, as reflecting a
confusion of description with prescription."
Recent applications of behavioral science to law slide from
description to prescription in the way that Funder criticizes. For
instance, behavioral science research, assuming we accept its
methodological validity, shows that humans deviate from a
rational-choice economic model of behavior." These scientific
findings support a criticism that the economic model of rationality
descriptively misses the mark." But legal scholarship drawing on
scientific findings seems-sometimes, even in the same article-to
begin with description but slip into prescription, interpreting the
science as showing not only that the model fails to accurately
describe subjects' behavior but that subjects' departure from the
model is normatively criticizable." This conclusion requires the
further claim that subjects should adopt the economic model. Yet
or sight go awry under certain stylized conditions, researchers hoped to infer
information about how, more generally, such processes are mentally structured.
Importantly, although this methodology has widely been interpreted by economists
and legal academics to suggest a normative policy program[-]one of altering
decision environments and otherwise nudging individuals to make decisions that
better comport with rational choice ideals ... no such program was originally
envisioned by the proponents of the research.").
10. Funder, supra note 4, at 78 ("The clearest as well as best known example
concerns the 'fundamental attribution error,' a term that seems to have become
firmly entrenched in the literature of social psychology. This error is the putative
tendency for people to overestimate the influence of attitudes and personality on
behavior, and to underestimate the power of the situation. ... Discussions of this
error have been relentlessly pessimistic; none of its presentations ... leave any
doubt that it may as well have been called the 'fundamental attribution
mistake.'. . . This error, like many others, is presumed to reflect a flaw in
judgment that people would be better off without.") (citations omitted).
11. See Whitman, supra note 1, at 470.
12. E.g., id. ("Rational choice theory, the foundation upon which law and
economics was built, has been criticized for oversimplifying the factors influencing
individuals' decision-making processes. Much of this criticism arises from
experimental evidence showing that actors frequently fail to act 'rationally'-that
is, their actions are not based on subjective comparisons of personal costs and
benefits-but instead systematically deviate from rational behavior based on a
variety of cognitive biases and mental shortcuts. Thus, while at a broad level
rational choice theory remains a helpful model to anticipate human responses to
changes in law, behavioral economists assert that these deviations can identify
failures in the conventional predictive model.").
13. E.g., id. at 472 (arguing that "legal incentives must operate not only on an
individual's internal cost-benefit calculus, but must also attempt to account for
these innate flaws in that person's ability to correctly conduct that calculus")
(emphasis added); id. at 495 (asserting that "cognitive biases, including the
'winner's bias,' cause athletes to act socially suboptimally and the government,




the methodology of behavioral science aims to describe how we do
act, not tell us how we should act.
Legal commentators should be clear about whether they
define bias descriptively or prescriptively." Employing a
prescriptive definition of bias requires an argument that the model
from which biased individuals' behavior diverges is normatively
privileged." Some legal authors have noted that using "bias" as
evidence of legal infirmity requires a normative argument in favor
of some models of decision making and against others." This
choice between descriptive and prescriptive definitions is not
unique to bias: defining other terms that are central to law, such
as coercion, also requires choosing between descriptive and
prescriptive definitions."
Responsibly employing the concept of "bias" when applying
behavioral science findings to law can be done in two ways. One is
to employ a purely descriptive definition of "bias," where bias
constitutes deviation from a model, but the model makes no claim
to normative superiority." While purely descriptive definitions of
14. See Robert J. MacCoun, Biases in the Interpretation and Use of Research
Results, 49 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 259, 260 (1998) ("The claim that a social scientist is
'biased' is rarely a neutral observation. In our culture, it can be a scathing
criticism, a devastating attack on the target's credibility, integrity, and honor.
Rather than coolly observing that 'Professor Doe's work is biased,' we are apt to spit
out a phrase like '. . . is completely biased' or '. . . is biased as hell.'" (citation
omitted)); id. at 263 ("[Slome forms of bias are more forgivable than others; indeed,
some seem normatively defensible.").
15. Cf id. at 268 ("[N]ormative justification distinguishes appropriate or
defensible biases from inappropriate or indefensible biases; justification is always
relative to some normative system. . . .").
16. E.g., Kysar, supra note 9, at 195 ("[Allthough even psychologists now
engage in a hearty debate regarding whether individuals in the world make 'good'
or 'bad' decisions through the use of heuristics, no such debate can fruitfully be
undertaken without some basic level of agreement among participants regarding
what normative benchmark serves to identify 'good' and 'bad' decision making.");
Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific
Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945, 950 (2006) ("Response bias need not indicate
something unwise, inappropriate, or even inaccurate. For example, instructors
may vary in their response bias in grading, such that some assign a relatively high
grade to average student performance while others assign a lower grade to the
same performance.... Unless there are established standards that associate
specific performances with specific grades, one could not accuse either instructor of
being less 'accurate' than the other.").
17. See Peter Westen, "Freedom" and "Coercion" -Virtue Words and Vice
Words, 1985 DUKE L.J. 541, 590 (1985) (describing coercion as "having descriptive
as well as prescriptive meanings"); see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional
Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1448 n.142 (1989) (differentiating descriptive
and normative definitions of coercion).
18. E.g., MacCoun, supra note 14 (distinguishing "appropriate or defensible
biases from inappropriate or indefensible biases" and noting that "justification is
always relative to some normative system"); Christopher G. Beevers et al.,
[Vol. 32:3136
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bias are frequent in psychology, such an approach is comparatively
infrequent in the legal literature. One such example is Gregory
Mitchell and Phillip Tetlock's definition of bias as "systematic
variation in judgmental tendencies elicited by some attribute or
property of a stimulus, such as a person's membership in a
particular group."" This definition does not treat bias as
normatively objectionable in itself: for instance, an instructor who
systematically spends more time with her students than with
other instructors' students would count as biased according to
Mitchell and Tetlock's definition, even though her systematic
pattern of concern is normatively unobjectionable.
Another legitimate approach involves explicitly employing
and normatively defending a prescriptive definition of bias.
Martha Chamallas, for instance, defines cognitive bias as "the use
of categories that are themselves shaped or contaminated by
confining stereotypes and habitual ways of thinking about
nondominant groups in our society."" The Second Circuit, in a
recent case, seems to define cognitive bias similarly.' Individuals
exhibiting bias in Chamallas's sense deviate not only from an
experimenter's model of behavior, but also from a model of
behavior that eschews the use of "confining stereotypes" and
habitual assumptions about how minority groups will behave."
Because habitually employing discriminatory stereotypes and
assumptions-unlike merely failing to conform to an
experimenter's predictions-is widely agreed to be normatively
unacceptable,22 evidence of bias in Chamallas's sense could justify
Identification of Emotionally Ambiguous Interpersonal Stimuli Among Dysphoric
and Nondysphoric Individuals, 33 COGNITIvE THERAPY & REs. 283, 288 (2008)
("Another issue regarding this task is how to define biased emotion identification.
Bias was defined as relative to the responses of the non-dysphoric group. We
assumed the non-dysphoric group provided normative responses on this task and
deviations from these responses reflected a bias.... We did consider using a more
putatively objective definition of bias.").
19. Gregory Mitchell & Phillip E. Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the
Perils of Mindreading, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1023, 1035 (2006). Note that, although
their article is published in a law review, Tetlock and Mitchell both hold doctorates
in psychology.
20. Martha Chamallas, The Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures in Tort Law,
146 U. PA. L. REv. 463, 467 (1998).
21. See Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 125
n.16 (2d Cir. 2004) ('[Sltereotypes are associated with 'cognitive biases,' which
cause people to ignore or exclude information that is inconsistent with a
stereotype."); cf Forensic Science and Standards Act of 2012, H.R. Res. 6106 § 2(3),
112th Cong. (2012) (noting "the importance of preventing cognitive bias").
22. Chamallas, supra note 20, at 466-67.
23. See, e.g., David Chang, Conflict, Coherence, and Constitutional Intent, 72
IOWA L. REV. 753, 858 (1987) ("Most of contemporary society agree, even in the
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change in legal norms. Chamallas's definition of bias, however,
excludes many so-called cognitive biases-for instance, loss
aversion-because these biases do not involve invidious
discrimination against nondominant groups.24
Distinguishing descriptive and prescriptive definitions of bias
illuminates two ways arguments can misfire:
1. They attempt to infer prescriptive claims directly from
the presence of bias even when bias has been defined
descriptively rather than prescriptively; or
2. They fail to be clear about whether a definition of bias is
descriptive (like Tetlock and Mitchell's) or prescriptive
(like Chamallas's).
Both are all too common. William Eskridge and John
Ferejohn go wrong in the first way when they interpret cognitive
psychologists as claiming "that rational actors better advance their
goals by making accurate rather than biased judgments,"2 ' and
then go on, without argument, to equate bias-influenced
judgments with "mental mistakes."" As we have seen,
psychologists frequently employ a purely technical definition of
bias that does not, on its own, support equating biases with
normative mistakes. Similarly, Goutam Jois states that if "our
common law system, and stare decisis [are] nothing more than
reflections of a constellation of correlated cognitive biases.... then
we are substantially worse off for relying on precedent, in all cases
and at all levels, than we would be in a system where each case
was approached with a blank slate."27 Again, this only follows if
forums of rough and dirty everyday politics, that law should not reflect racist
attitudes. National majorities, through Congress, have enacted federal legislation
prohibiting racial discrimination in many contexts."); Susan Stefan, "You'd Have to
Be Crazy to Work Here:" Worker Stress, the Abusive Workplace, and Title I of the
ADA, 31 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 795, 840 (1998) ("While race discrimination and gender
discrimination laws have not eliminated racism and sexism from the workplace,
they have established a common understanding that such behavior is
unacceptable.").
24. Chamallas, supra note 20, at 466-67.
25. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Structuring Lawmaking to
Reduce Cognitive Bias: A Critical View, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 616, 616 (2001); see
also Chester M. Gorski, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH), at 25 n.67,
available at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrdispositions/documents/legal
pleading/idgorskiO82399.pdf ("A cognitive bias creates a filter through which events
become distorted because certain values become internalized or certain views
become held even in the face of contrary facts.").
26. Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 25, at 621; cf Russell Korobkin, Possibility
and Plausibility in Law and Economics, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 781, 782 (2004)
(using the pejorative language of "susceptibility to cognitive biases").
27. Jois, supra note 1, at 67.
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cognitive biases are defined prescriptively. Jois offers no
argument that they are.
Christine Jolls, Cass Sunstein, and Richard Thaler make the
second mistake in an extremely influential Stanford Law Review
article.28 Jolls et al. begin with the descriptive claim that people
using a heuristic will "make forecasts that are different from those
that emerge from the standard rational-choice model."29
Departures from a rational choice model, however, provide no
cause for concern unless people ought to employ that model-a
claim that would require argument. 0 Yet Jolls et al. later slip,
without argument, into prescriptively treating the influence of
cognitive biases as normatively objectionable."
28. Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach
to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1472, 1477-78 (1998).
29. Id.; accord Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Heuristics and Biases at the
Bargaining Table, 87 MARQ. L. REv. 795, 795 (2004) ("According to the normative
model, negotiators should compare the subjective expected value of an agreement
to the subjective expected value of non-agreement .... Once a negotiator has
calculated the expected value of each course of action, the negotiator should then
select the one that promises the greatest return."); cf Dan M. Kahan et al., Who
Fears the HPV Vaccine, Who Doesn't, and Why? An Experimental Study of the
Mechanisms of Cultural Cognition, 34 L. & HuM. BEHAv. 501, 512 (2010)
(summarizing Sunstein's view and that of Howard Margolis as an "'irrational-
weigher' theory" which "holds that individuals, due to various cognitive limitations
and biases, are incapable of processing risk information in a manner that promotes
their expected utility" (emphasis added)); Funder, supra note 4, at 77 (discussing a
variety of "idealized, normative models of the judgment process," which
"emphasized the logical structure of judgment, and were based on the working
assumption that people are perfectly 'rational' processors of information").
30. Compare Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 29, at 795 (arguing that "the
interdisciplinary field of 'decision theory' offers . .. a normative account (how
should individuals act)" and defining the normative account as adherence to a
rational-choice model), with Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the
Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 317, 342 (1977)
(criticizing rational-choice theorists for ignoring the legitimate role of
"commitment" in individual reasoning: "[clommitment sometimes relates to a
sense of obligation going beyond the consequences. Sometimes the lack of personal
gain in particular acts is accepted by considering the value of rules of behavior.
But even within a consequentialist act-evaluation framework, the exclusion of any
consideration other than self-interest seems to impose a wholly arbitrary limitation
on the notion of rationality.").
31. Jolls et al., supra note 28, at 1501 ("[P]eople's perceptions are distorted by
self-serving bias."); id. at 1524 ("Hindsight bias will lead juries making negligence
determinations to find defendants liable more frequently than if cost-benefit
analysis were done correctly-that is, on an ex ante basis. Thus, plaintiffs will win
cases they deserve to lose."). The latter claim in particular seems like simply a
stipulation that tort law should be about cost-benefit analysis and nothing else.
39
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II. Statistical Significance, Effect Size, and Normative
Significance
In this Part, I identify another distinction that bears on the
normative relevance of bias. An experimental finding of bias can
be significant in two different senses: statistically (meeting a
statistical test of significance) and what I'll call "sizeably"
(markedly affecting the phenomenon under study)." Each is
compatible with, but does not entail, the other. An effect of
infinitesimal size can be statistically significant when the sample
under study is very large." Conversely, a sizeable effect can be
statistically insignificant if the sample size is very small."
Some legal scholars have noted that not all statistically
significant results are sizeable." Encouragingly, some case law
has similarly differentiated the two types of significance."
32. Sarah H. Ramsey & Robert F. Kelly, Assessing Social Science Studies:
Eleven Tips for Judges and Lawyers, 40 FAM. L.Q. 367, 376 (2006) ("Statistical
significance is the likelihood that a researcher is seeing a relationship or effect due
to sampling error; in other words, the likelihood that the researcher will be wrong if
the researcher believes a true effect exists. Substantive significance has to do with
the size of the effect or the strength of a relationship; that is, with regard to
decisions that must be made, is the effect large enough to meaningfully influence
the decision one is making.").
33. Robert F. Kelly & Sarah H. Ramsey, Assessing and Communicating Social
Science Information in Family and Child Judicial Settings: Standards for Judges
and Allied Professionals, 45 FAM. CT. REV. 22, 32 (2006) ("[Blecause statistical
significance is strongly influenced by the size of the sample used in analyses, large
samples may yield statistically significant findings that are inconsequential in
terms of the size of the effect of one variable on another."); see also Siu L. Chow,
Significance Test or Effect Size?, 103 PSYCHOL. BULL. 105, 106 (1988) (noting the
effect of sample size on statistical significance and its potential to mask the
relevance of effect size).
34. E.g., Michael D. Maltz, Deviating from the Mean: The Declining
Significance of Significance, 31 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 434, 439-40 (1994)
(discussing an experiment with a small sample size that lacked statistical
significance nonetheless gave doctors at the time good reason, because of the large
effect size, to believe that citrus fruit cured scurvy).
35. E.g., Catherine Barnard & Bob Hepple, Indirect Discrimination:
Interpreting Seymour-Smith, 58 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 399, 407 (1999) ("Statistical
significance tests were devised to solve the problem of small sample sizes, but once
there is a very large sample (e.g. the national labour force), then statistical
significance tests are misleading. Where the sample is large, then the question is
whether the differences are substantially or practically important."); Ramsey &
Kelly, supra note 32, at 376; Kelly & Ramsey, supra note 33, at 32; Maltz, supra
note 34, at 440 ("Statistical significance does not imply substantive significance,
and most researchers know this-but this does not stop them from implying that it
does. In other words, there are (conceptually) Type I and Type II errors that
distinguish statistical significance from substantive significance: not all
statistically significant findings are substantively significant, and not all
substantively significant findings are statistically significant.").
36. E.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 53-54 (1986) (differentiating the
claims that "the correlation between the race of the voter and the voter's choice of
40 [Vol. 32:31
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However, in the particular arena of work on bias and the law,
some experiments that find statistically significant bias are
consistent with an ultimate determination that the effect or
pervasiveness of the bias is small." Furthermore, many scholars
considering the relevance of bias to legal practice have conflated
statistical significance and effect size."
It is also worth noting that neither statistical significance nor
effect size reliably entail a third type of "significance"-relevance
to our choices about social or legal norms." A bias that lacks
statistical significance or has only an infinitesimal effect size
might seem obviously irrelevant to law. But on many plausible
normative perspectives, such as motive utilitarianism,"
Kantianism," and Aristotelian virtue ethics,"' the presence of a
psychological motivation with only an infinitesimal or statistically
uncertain effect can make a normative difference.
certain candidates was statistically significant" and that "the degree of racial bloc
voting was 'so marked as to be substantively significant, in the sense that the
results of the individual election would have been different depending upon
whether it had been held among only the white voters or only the black voters'"
(citation omitted)); Waisome v. Port Auth., 948 F.2d 1370, 1376 (2d Cir. 1991)
(noting that a disparity did not justify a finding that defendants violated Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act because "though the disparity was found to be statistically
significant, it was of limited magnitude," and stating that "statistical significance
tells nothing of the importance, magnitude, or practical significance of a disparity").
37. E.g., Mitchell, supra note 1, at 1952 (discussing a case where "the
statistically significant difference was attributable to only fifteen percent of the
subjects changing their choices ... . Although this fifteen percent of the population
may be a statistically significant number of respondents displaying inconsistency or
'error' .. . should we in this instance label the normative principle descriptively
incorrect on the basis of this rather small, internally inconsistent minority?").
38. Id. at 1955-57 n.89 (collecting examples).
39. See Carolyn J. Hill et al., Empirical Benchmarks for Interpreting Effect
Sizes in Research, 2 CHILD DEV. PERSP. 172, 172 (2008) ("We argue that effect sizes
should ... be interpreted with respect to empirical benchmarks that are relevant to
the intervention, target population, and outcome measure being considered.");
Michelle M. Mello, Using Statistical Evidence to Prove the Malpractice Standard of
Care: Bridging Legal, Clinical, and Statistical Thinking, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REv.
821, 836-45 (2002) (noting that statistical significance is neither necessary nor
sufficient for legal significance).
40. See Robert Merrihew Adams, Motive Utilitarianism, 73 J. PHIL. 467, 470
(1976) ("[TIhe consequences of any acts one is ... led to perform are not always the
only utility-bearing consequences of being influenced, to a given degree, by a
motive.").
41. E.g., IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 14
(Allen W. Wood ed. & trans., Yale Univ. Press 2002) (1785) (stating that an action
only has "authentic moral worth" when an agent "does the action without any
inclination, solely from duty").
42. E.g., ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 80 (W.D. Ross trans., Oxford Univ.




That normative significance requires neither statistical
significance nor effect size is particularly relevant to the law of
implicit racial bias. Gregory Mitchell has asserted that there is
little reason to be worried about rare or infinitesimal biases.3
Some case law likewise denies the legal significance of biases that
have only negligible effects." If we adopt a consequentialist
stance, which only legally regulates behavior when it leads to bad
outcomes, we will conclude-with Mitchell-that the law should
not address implicit racial biases that have only infinitesimal
effects. But if we adopt a stance that draws on motive-utilitarian,
Kantian, or Aristotelian insights, we may conclude that the law
should address implicit racial biases even if swamping factors
prevent the biases from producing bad effects.
Such a nonconsequentialist stance might morally
differentiate (1) cases where psychological processes internal to
the agent, such as shame or self-control, prevent implicit racial
bias from producing bad effects, from (2) cases where external
factors prevent implicit biases from producing bad effects. On this
view, a criminal attempt that failed because of external factors but
was motivated in part by implicit bias could be classifiable as a
hate crime, even though less culpable than a failed attempt
motivated by intentional racism."
43. Mitchell, supra note 1, at 1958 ("If the deleterious effects of cognitive biases
found in the laboratory are not substantial or widespread, then little justification
exists for system-wide reforms to address these biases.").
44. Mitchell & Tetlock, supra note 19, at 1038-39 ("Courts typically require
that the adverse action against the plaintiff rise above what Dean White calls 'de
minimis' discrimination. Thus, many subtle acts by managers or co-workers that
psychologists would label discriminatory do not rise to the level of illegal
discrimination unless accompanied by some tangible effect or unless they
cumulatively create a hostile work environment."); cf Waisome v. Port Auth., 948
F.2d 1370, 1376 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding that if "two additional [Bilack candidates
passed the written examination the disparity would no longer be of statistical
importance," a statistically significant disparity did not justify a legal judgment
against defendant).
45. Attempts can constitute hate crimes. See, e.g., People v. Duggan, No.
B218451, 2011 WL 1335187, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist. Apr. 8, 2011) (enhanced
sentencing for a defendant who "attempts to commit a felony that is a hate crime");
Andrews v. State, 930 A.2d 846, 855 (Del. 2007) ("Any person who commits, or
attempts to commit, any crime as defined by the laws of this State, and who
intentionally . .. [s]elects the victim because of the victim's race, religion, color,
disability, sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry, shall be guilty of a hate
crime." (emphasis added)); People v. Assi, 877 N.Y.S.2d 231 (App. Div. 2009)
(holding that attempted arson constituted a hate crime). So, too, can motivation by
implicit bias. See J. Rebekka S. Bonner, Reconceptualizing VAWA's "Animus" for
Rape in States' Emerging Post-VAWA Civil Rights Legislation, 111 YALE L.J. 1417,
1425 (2002) ("[With this new intermediate animus standard, the possibility still
existed that a VAWA defendant need not have been conscious of the motive of bias
in committing the violence: [tihe civil rights remedy could have been read to
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III. Normatively Justifiable Biases
In this Part, I will explore cases where behavior that could be
classified descriptively as biased does not meet a prescriptive
definition of bias, because although the behavior diverges from the
experimenter's preferred model, it nonetheless accords with
another normatively justifiable model." I begin with a non-legal
example about the developmental psychology of moral reasoning,
and then continue by discussing a variety of legal examples,
including fiduciary responsibility, omission bias, the endowment
effect, and confirmation bias.
A. Two Models of Moral Development
Carol Gilligan's influential criticism of Lawrence Kohlberg's
theory of moral reasoning demonstrates how behavior that
diverges from an experimenter's model can nonetheless be
normatively acceptable." Kohlberg's model defines six categories
of moral reasoning, and treats "higher" stages of reasoning as
normatively superior." Gilligan's response is that an alternative,
equally appealing model of human behavior can vindicate some
conduct Kohlberg's model of human behavior regards as inferior.49
Gilligan's argument examines the responses of two study
subjects, Amy and Jake, to the "Heinz dilemma," in which "a man
named Heinz considers whether or not to steal a drug which he
permit the use of circumstantial evidence of implicit bias motivation rather than
requiring explicit indicia of intent.").
46. Cf Funder, supra note 4, at 82 ("Many other frequently demonstrated
errors may reflect adaptive processes in the real world."). In this Part, I consider
whether biases may in fact be consistent with normative reasons (with an agent's
acting rightly or justly), whereas Funder considered whether such biases are
adaptive, i.e. consistent with prudential reasons (with an agent's acting in her own
interest). Cf Mark Kelman, Saving Lives, Saving From Death, Saving From
Dying: Reflections on 'Over-Valuing' Identifiable Victims, 11 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y
L. & ETHICS 51, 62 (2011) (discussing the assertion that "subjects who seemingly
fail to meet ends ascribed to them by experimenters actually are consciously or
semi-consciously meeting a separate, less obvious end").
47. See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 18 (1982) (explaining that "the
very traits that traditionally have defined the 'goodness' of women, their care for
and sensitivity to the needs of others, are those that mark them as deficient in
moral development" according to Kohlberg).
48. Lawrence Kohlberg, The Claim to Moral Adequacy of a Highest Stage of
Moral Judgment, 70 J. PHIL. 630, 630 (1973) (endorsing "the claim that a higher or
later stage of moral judgment is 'objectively' preferable to or more adequate than an
earlier stage of judgment according to certain moral criteria").
49. GILLIGAN, supra note 47, at 25 ("Adding a new line of interpretation, based
on the imagery of the girl's thought, makes it possible not only to see development
where previously development was not discerned but also to consider differences in




cannot afford to buy in order to save the life of his wife."" Jake
approaches the dilemma "as a conflict between the values of
property and life,... discerns the logical priority of life [,] and uses
that logic to justify his choice,"" which is that Heinz should steal
the drug. Jake's approach, which shows "his ability to bring
deductive logic to bear on the solution of moral dilemmas, to
differentiate morality from law, and to see how laws can be
considered to have mistakes" places him "on Kohlberg's scale, [at]
a mixture of stages three and four."5 2 In contrast, Amy argues that
"if Heinz and the druggist had talked it out long enough, they
could reach something besides stealing," and so refuses to conclude
that a conflict between values exists." Gilligan believes that
Amy's responses, "when considered in the light of Kohlberg's
definition of the stages and sequence of moral
development ... appear to be a full stage lower in maturity than
those of the boy," because they would reflect "an inability to think
systematically about the concepts of morality or law, [and] a
reluctance to challenge authority or to examine the logic of
received moral truths."'
Gilligan, however, proposes an alternative to Kohlberg's
view, one that captures the normative value of Amy's reasoning.
Gilligan believes that Amy's
world is a world of relationships and psychological truths
where an awareness of the connection between people gives
rise to a recognition of responsibility for one another, a
perception of the need for response. Seen in this light, her
understanding of morality as arising from the recognition of
relationship, her belief in communication as the mode of
conflict resolution, and her conviction that the solution to the
dilemma will follow from its compellin representation seem
far from naive or cognitively immature.
Gilligan does not conclude that Kohlberg's model is mistaken;
rather, she argues that her model represents a reasonable
50. Id.
51. Id. at 26.
52. Id. at 27.
53. Id. at 29.
54. Id. at 30.
55. Id. Note that Gilligan does not believe that the two models necessarily map
onto a gender difference. See, e.g., id. at 25 ("The choice of a girl whose moral
judgments elude existing categories of developmental assessment is meant to
highlight the issue of interpretation rather than to exemplify sex differences per
se.").
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alternative.' Her proposal, she believes, could be complementary
to Kohlberg's, rather than either being better than the other."7
Gilligan's critique teaches us something important about
bias's relevance to law: bias's relevance to law depends on the
normative superiority of the model from which the biased behavior
in question systematically deviates. Absent evidence of such
normative superiority, we should constantly remain aware of the
possibility of a "new line of interpretation:" an alternative model
of behavior that deviates from the experimenter's model but
normatively justifies the pattern of behavior in question.'
B. Cognitive Bias and Fiduciary Responsibility
Moving from psychology to legal practice, consider Gregory
Alexander's claim that "[clognitive factors lead courts to analyze
fiduciary relationships, at least those that are property-based,
differently than they evaluate contractual relationships.""
Alexander goes on to assert that "[iun cases involving alleged
breaches of fiduciary duties, courts tend to use a top-down mode of
cognitive analysis; whereas in cases of alleged contractual
breaches, they employ a bottom-up cognitive method."60
56. Id. at 31 ("[Tlhe arrangement of these answers as successive stages on a
scale of increasing moral maturity calibrated by the logic of the boy's response
misses the different truth revealed in the judgment of the girl. To the question,
'What does he see that she does not?' Kohlberg's theory provides a ready response,
manifest in the scoring of Jake's judgments a full stage higher than Amy's in moral
maturity; to the question, 'What does she see that he does not?' Kohlberg's theory
has nothing to say. Since most of her responses fall through the sieve of Kohlberg's
scoring system, her responses appear from his perspective to lie outside the moral
domain.").
57. Id. at 33 ("The contrasting images of hierarchy and network in children's
thinking about moral conflict and choice illuminate two views of morality which are
complementary rather than sequential or opposed. But this construction of
differences goes against the bias of developmental theory toward ordering
differences in a hierarchical mode.").
58. Id. at 25 ("Adding a new line of interpretation, based on the imagery of the
girl's thought, makes it possible not only to see development where previously
development was not discerned but also to consider differences in the
understanding of relationships without scaling these differences from better to
worse."); cf Mark Kelman, Behavioral Economics as Part of a Rhetorical Duet: A
Response to Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1577, 1579 (1998)
(arguing for a greater recognition of the "degree to which stories about behavior,
whether rational actor stories or 'richer' behavioral ones, are essentially
interpretive tropes rather than full-blown verifiable or falsifiable theories," and
greater recognition "that behavioral and mainstream economics can both best be
used as approaches to data that are inexorably ambiguous in their implications").




According to Alexander, top-down approaches are "theory-
driven," while bottom-up approaches are "data-driven," and "[t]he
most important consequence of the difference between these two
approaches is that courts are more likely to hold fiduciaries liable
for losses to beneficiaries than they are to hold ordinary
contracting parties liable for losses their counterparties may
experience."
Here, however, is an alternative way of interpreting
Alexander's findings: courts' different modes of cognitive analysis
for fiduciary and contractual breaches simply reflect that they
approach fiduciary duties using nonconsequentialist norms, which
treat a breach as a wrong over and above any economic
inefficiency, whereas they apply consequentialist, economic norms
to ordinary contractual duties.62 This possibility is further
supported by Alexander's description of fiduciary duties as
governed by what he calls "the fiduciary role-schema."' Alexander
goes on to state that "courts possess a fairly well-developed
schema of the fiduciary role, but have not developed a comparable
schema for ordinary contracting parties""-which, again, could
simply involve courts being nonconsequentialist about fiduciaries
but consequentialist about ordinary contracts.
After introducing the fact that courts treat fiduciaries and
counterparties differently, Alexander states that "[t]he fiduciary
role-schema often makes courts more likely to over-interpret
behavior of fiduciaries than in the case of conventional contracts."65
It's not clear what Alexander means by "over-interpret." If he
means that courts interpret fiduciary behavior more than they
interpret conventional contract behavior, this is true but
unsurprising: applying nonconsequentialist norms involves
attending to details of behavior that consequentialist norms treat
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 768-69 ("The judicial tendency to apply top-down cognitive processes
in cases involving property fiduciaries stems principally from a cognitive
phenomenon called the schema. Legal scholars, including those working in BDT
[behavioral decision theory], have thus far overlooked this phenomenon. A schema
is a coguitive [sic] bias that the psychological literature defines as 'a cognitive
structure that represents knowledge about a concept or type of stimulus, including
its attributes and the relations among those attributes.' More simply, a schema is
a fuzzy-edged, but still relatively clear, preconceived image that the observer has of
a particular situation or person.").
64. Id. at 769.
65. Id.
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as unimportant. Conversely, if he means that courts interpret
fiduciary behavior more than they ought to, this is surprising but
unsupported. Only if we presuppose that fiduciaries should be
treated like ordinary counterparties can we conclude that
interpreting fiduciary behavior more stringently is normatively
criticizable.
Alexander demurs at first from arguing that adopting the
fiduciary role-schema is normatively inappropriate.67 However, by
the end of the article, he treats judges' employment of theory-
driven (as opposed to "data-driven") analysis as a mistake.' The
arguments he offers for this conclusion, however, are extremely
tendentious, and seem at bottom no more than a bare normative
assertion that we should become consequentialists about
fiduciaries' responsibilities. He states that "because fiduciaries,
like parents and masters, are expected to protect their charges
when beneficiaries experience losses, judges are apt to blame the
responsible fiduciary." But, while Alexander gives us ample
reason to believe what we already know-that judges do treat
fiduciaries differently from ordinary contracting parties-he gives
us no reasons to believe that judges should treat fiduciaries and
nonfiduciaries similarly. He asserts that "we should expect
greater accuracy in determining liability in judicial decisions on
contract claims than on breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims. This
discrepancy results because courts employ a more data-driven
mode of analysis in contract cases that is relatively uninfluenced
by knowledge structures like role-schemas."o This claim about
"accuracy" is a non sequitur-given Alexander's earlier admission
that role-schemas are not inherently undesirable, why believe that
they will lead judges astray in fiduciary duty cases?
A successful argument against the fiduciary role-schema
would have to offer and defend a normative definition of accuracy,
66. See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120
HARv. L. REV. 708, 751-52 (2007) (proposing an approach to contract law that
would "affirm and support ... public declarations of equal status," and prioritizing
this moral goal over economistic goals: "that such a system also tends to create
efficient systems of economic exchange is an important side benefit that may affect
many of our decisions about how to structure the institution, but only in ways
complementary to our other moral purposes").
67. Alexander, supra note 1, at 771 ("Schemas are neither inherently desirable
nor undesirable; they simply are.").
68. Id. at 785 ("Not all courts fall prey to cognitive errors when dealing with
claims against fiduciaries. Sometimes, the analysis is more data-driven and leads
to accurate decisions. Yet, cognitive error likely creeps into judicial analysis in
contract cases as well as fiduciary cases.").




and contend that the fiduciary schema leads to inaccuracy under
that definition. Absent such argument, treating the fiduciary
schema as inaccurate seems no more justified than holding that,
for instance, subjecting people engaged in abnormally dangerous
activities to strict liability rather than negligence liability
produces "inaccurate" results. The idea behind strict liability is
that the nature of certain actions can subject actors to a different
standard of liability.n
Alexander also charges judges with holding fiduciaries to an
overly high standard because they are influenced by a "hindsight
bias" when they evaluate fiduciaries' actions: this hindsight bias
causes judges to hold fiduciaries liable for harms that could not
have been foreseen ex ante." Again, consider strict liability in
tort. A fairness-based justification for strict liability does not rest
strict liability on the claim that the strictly liable party
misevaluated the likely costs and benefits of her actions: rather, it
bases her liability on the nature of the activity in which she
engaged.
Furthermore, a certain amount of "normative risk"-the risk
that even someone acting reasonably ex ante will incur
rectificatory obligations ex post-may well be inescapable." The
plausibility of normative risk presents a reason to reject, for
example, what David Hoffman calls the "Rule of Law" picture,
71. See, e.g., In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 521 F.3d 1028, 1049 (9th
Cir. 2008) (holding that defendants' activity in developing an atomic bomb was
abnormally dangerous and so supported strict liability); Commander Oil Corp. v.
Barlo Equip. Corp., 215 F.3d 321, 330 (2d Cir. 2000) ("Central to the Rylands v.
Fletcher theory of strict liability is the underlying fairness of imposing on the
beneficiaries of an ultra-hazardous activity the ultimate costs of that activity."); see
also WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 522 (4th ed. 1971)
(noting that one possible basis for "plac[ing the absolute responsibility for
preventing the harm upon the defendant" is that "his conduct is regarded as
fundamentally anti-social"); George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort
Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 542 (1972) (seeing strict liability as justified by the
rationale "that a victim has a right to recover for injuries caused by a risk greater
in degree and different in order from those created by the victim and imposed on
the defendant-in short, for injuries resulting from nonreciprocal risks").
72. Alexander, supra note 1, at 783.
73. See Aditi Bagchi, Managing Moral Risk: The Case of Contract, 111 COLUM.
L. REV. 1878, 1888 (2011) ("When a reasonable risk results in great harm to
another, however, it is the insight of the concept of moral luck and related
literature that one is nevertheless morally on the hook, or at least regarded as such
by both oneself and others. The result is that even when one acts reasonably, one
acts knowing that one may commit wrongs, or at least incur negative
responsibility."); cf Julie Tannenbaum, Emotional Expressions of Moral Value, 132
PHIL. STuD. 43, 55 (2007) (arguing that someone driving in an ex ante reasonable
manner may still commit a "morally inadequate act" if he hits and kills a
pedestrian whose presence he could not have foreseen).
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which "requires that parties be able to determine, at the time
when they are acting, the ultimate legal cost of that action with
some certainty."" Normative risk, which the "eggshell plaintiff'
rule exemplifies, implies that some legal costs are not predictable
in advance."
C. Additional Justifiable Biases
Other "biases" or "cognitive limitations" that legal scholars
have criticized are in fact consistent with normatively defensible
models of human conduct, just as I have argued that fiduciary
responsibility is. In this Subpart, I examine several, though no
doubt others exist.
1. Omission Bias
Some have criticized the "omission bias," which treats actions
as more significant than omissions." But, as Douglas Kysar
argues, the omission bias can be an acceptable influence on legal
norms:
First, a general-and testy-point about the omission bias:
[tihere is no such thing as an omission bias. Only strict
impartial consequentialist-utilitarians such as the
74. Hoffman, supra note 3, at 519; see also Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S.
Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption From
Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1097 (2000) ("Jolls, Sunstein, and
Thaler have suggested that the [hindsight] bias might be avoided by shielding
juries from evidence concerning what action the defendant actually took until after
jurors have determined what decision would have been reasonable ex ante.").
75. Hoffman, supra note 3, at 520. The "eggshell plaintiff" rule holds tort
defendants liable for harms to plaintiffs even if those harms are in part
attributable to the plaintiffs' unusual and unforeseeable vulnerabilities. Dan B.
Dobbs et al., DOBBS LAW OF TORTS § 206 (2d ed. 2011). The canonical eggshell
plaintiff case is Vosburg v. Putney, 50 N.W. 403 (Wise. 1891). See also Jenson v.
Eveleth Taconite Co., 130 F.3d 1287, 1294-95 (8th Cir. 1997) (endorsing the
"eggshell plaintiff" rule in cases of emotional harm and collecting similar cases
from other circuits); Benn v. Thomas, 512 N.W.2d 537, 538 (Iowa 1994) (upholding
the eggshell plaintiff rule and stating that it "requires the defendant to take his
plaintiff as he finds him, even if that means that the defendant must compensate
the plaintiff for harm an ordinary person would not have suffered").
76. E.g., Jon Hanson & Kathleen Hanson, The Blame Frame: Justifying
(Racial) Injustice in America, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 425 (2006) (listing
'omission bias" among the "motivated attributions . . . [that] produce a distorting
frame that allows us to perceive justice in the face of oppression, coercion, and
injustice."); Daniel M. Isaacs, Baseline Framing in Sentencing, 121 YALE L.J. 426,
445 (2011) ("[The omission bias may cause judges to inadequately adjust sentences
from the baseline, because judges may prefer the harms caused by passively
applying the default sentence over the harms caused by actively altering it.");
Robert A. Prentice, Chicago Man, K-T Man, and the Future of Behavioral Law and
Economics, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1663, 1726-28 (2003) (listing omission bias among the
"illusions" to which even experts can fall prey).
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psychologist Jonathan Baron regard these effects as indicative
of bias. For others, including what is probably the majority of
moral philosophers, longstanding conventions such as the act-
omission distinction are an essential, indeed ineliminable
aspect of moral reasoning.
As Kysar points out, analyses like Baron's redescribe a
normative stance, nonconsequentialism, as what Alafair Burke
calls an "information-processing bias."7 ' Nonconsequentialist
reasoning that employs an act-omission distinction will indeed
diverge from what a consequentialist model of human behavior
predicts. But this gives us no reason to criticize
nonconsequentialist reasoning as "biased" in a pejorative sense
unless the consequentialist model is normatively superior-a claim
that is deeply contested and for which legal scholars invoking
cognitive bias generally provide no support." As such, a broad,
descriptive definition of the omission bias--e.g., Baron's definition
of omission bias as "the bias toward harm caused by omissions
when that is pitted against harm caused by acts"s-cannot
support legal or policy prescriptions without additional normative
argument. Prescriptive use of omission bias should be restricted,
as Jeffrey Rachlinski and his co-authors do, to cases where the
action-omission distinction is agreed to be morally irrelevant."
77. Kysar, supra note 9, at 191-92; see also Mitchell N. Berman, Replay, 99
CALIF. L. REV. 1683, 1720 n.84 (2011) ("[Ilt is far from clear when omission bias is a
genuine cognitive error or irrational as opposed to a substantive moral judgment.").
78. Alafair Burke, Neutralizing Cognitive Bias: An Invitation to Prosecutors, 2
N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 512, 515 (2007).
79. See Govind C. Persad, Risk, Everyday Intuitions, and the Institutional
Value of Tort Law, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1445, 1450-52 (2010) (defending the relevance
of a nonconsequentialist act/omission distinction to law); cf Kelman, supra note 46,
at 56 (critiquing the "mainstream intuition among fundamentally utilitarian 'policy
wonks' that subjects who spend more to save an identified life than they would
choose to spend to prevent the death of an unidentified person are, at core, the
poster children for the persistence of irrationality and error").
80. Jonathan Baron, Value Analysis of Political Behavior-Self-
Interested : Moralistic :: Altruistic : Moral, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1135, 1161 (2003).
81. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Inside the Bankruptcy Judge's Mind, 86 B.U. L.
REV. 1227, 1242 (2006) ("Iln situations where acts and omissions are morally
equivalent, people who judge 'harmful commissions as worse than the
corresponding omissions' commit the so-called 'omission bias.'" (emphasis
added)(citation omitted)); cf Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives:
Behavioral Economics and the Case for "Asymmetric Paternalism," 151 U. PA. L.
REV. 1211, 1224 (2003) (describing the "omission/commission bias" as "the tendency
to care much more about errors of commission than about errors of omission, even
when there is no obvious normative reason to draw a distinction" (emphasis added));
Ken Levy, Killing, Letting Die, and the Case for Mildly Punishing Bad
Samaritanism, 44 GA. L. REV. 607, 647 n.80 (2010) ("'[Olmission bias'. .. means
that we tend irrationally to favor omissions over positive actions even in contexts
where there is actually no moral distinction between them.").
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(However, on the very next page, Rachlinski et al. go on, without
argument, to tendentiously classify as "omission bias" subjects'
evaluation of an active lie as morally worse than a material
omission.")
2. Familiarity Bias
Some have criticized the view that personal relationships
generate special obligations as reflecting a "'familiarity' bias,
under which '[people are more willing to harm strangers than
individuals they know, especially when those individuals are
paying clients with whom they have ongoing relationships."'" At
least one administrative law decision has similarly characterized
this pattern of concern as an objectionable cognitive bias.' Yet
there are strong normative arguments that giving greater weight
to the interests of nearby people, salient people, and intimates can
be normatively acceptable." The normative relevance of
82. Rachlinski, supra note 81, at 1243. For a moral argument differentiating
different forms of deception, see, for example, Collin O'Neil, Lying, Trust, and
Gratitude, 40 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 301, 325-33 (2012) (differentiating "deceit by
communication" from "covert deceit").
83. James Fanto, Whistleblowing and the Public Director: Countering Corporate
Inner Circles, 83 OR. L. REV. 435,464 n.96 (2004) (quoting Max H. Bazerman et al.,
Why Good Accountants Do Bad Audits, HARV. BUS. REV., Nov. 2002, at 100); see
also Iris H-Y Chiu, Securities Intermediaries in the Internet Age and the
Traditional Principal-Agent Model of Regulation: Some Observations From
European Union Securities Regulation, 2 VA. L. & Bus. REV. 307, 346-47 (2007) ("In
an online context, depersonalization of the client-intermediary relationship causes
bilateral information asymmetry. Depersonalization, however, also removes
certain social and cognitive pressures for client reliance. Professors Donald
Langevoort and Robert Prentice have written at length on how personalization of
relations with brokers creates cognitive biases on the part of the investor towards
the broker, and hence reliance on the broker."); Neal R. Feigenson, Sympathy and
Legal Judgment: A Psychological Analysis, 65 TENN. L. REV. 1, 52 (1997) ("[An
empathy-based morality, as Martin Hoffman has argued, is too prone to be biased
by the salience and source of the stimulus. A cry of pain may arouse more
empathic distress than a facial grimace; a friend's or relative's cry more than a
stranger's.").
84. Chester M. Gorski, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) nn.67, 70,
available at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrdispositions/documents/legal
pleading/idgorskiO82399.pdf (defining bias as distortion, and then asserting that
"an employment relationship may also lead to a cognitive bias" in part because
"staff tend to empathize with the organization, its goals and its views").
85. For a discussion of friendship as a normatively defensible basis for action,
see David 0. Brink, Impartiality and Associative Duties, 13 UTILITAS 152, 153
(2001), arguing that "[o]ur intuitions about associational duties ... admit of a
philosophical rationale at least as plausible as anything the consequentialist has to
offer." See also Samuel Scheffler, Relationships and Responsibilities, 26 PHIL. &
PUB. AFFAIRS 189, 195 (1997) (suggesting an argument that justifies special
responsibilities to friends). For a discussion of nearness and vividness, see
FRANCES M. KAMM, INTRICATE ETHICS chs. 11-12 (2007), arguing that nearness to
a rescuee can strengthen one's duties to rescue. See also FRANCES M. KAMM,
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friendship and familiarity finds support in the case law of tort and
contract."
Eskridge and Ferejohn similarly criticize the "availability
heuristic" for giving greater weight to vivid information and to the
interests of friends, reserving particular criticism for "pro-life
conservatives [who] are open to stem cell research because they
have relatives suffering from the targeted diseases," whom they
charge are in the grip of availability and representativeness
heuristics." However, responses that weigh vivid information
highly could be a normatively defensible emotional response to
particularly meaningful or culturally important risks.' Indeed,
"worldview bias" seems simply to be the unavoidable result of
having any normative commitments at all."
3. Endowment Effect
The "endowment effect" involves people who hold property
evaluating that property as more valuable than others do." Some
MORALITY, MORTALITY VOL. 2: RIGHTS, DUTIES, & STATUS 233 (2001) ("[It may be
because I actually have vivid knowledge that I have reason to act. It might be
morally monstrous to be able to ignore such knowledge, whereas it might not be
monstrous to be able to ignore the pale (even complete) propositional knowledge.").
86. See, e.g., Farwell v. Keaton, 240 N.W.2d 217, 222 (Mich. 1976) (holding
defendant had an affirmative duty to aid plaintiff because the two "were
companions on a social venture. Implicit in such a common undertaking is the
understanding that one will render assistance to the other when he is in peril if he
can do so without endangering himself."); Frowen v. Blank, 425 A.2d 412, 418 (Pa.
1981) (finding that friendship between parties to a contract involved a "confidential
relation" that produced obligations of fairness); see also Ethan J. Leib, Friendship
and the Law, 54 UCLA L. REV. 631, 685-94 (2007) (discussing legal obligations that
flow from friendship).
87. Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 25, at 621-24 (criticizing as biased a
tendency to "overgeneralize from dramatic and emotionally striking events").
88. Dan M. Kahan, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Risk Regulation, 156 U. PA.
L. REv. 741, 756 (2008) ("Because all persons of all cultural persuasions have a
stake in forming an evaluation . .. that appropriately expresses their values,
there's no reason to view anyone's response to . .. vividness ... as biased rather
than rationally informed by emotion.").
89. Regina F. Burch, Worldview Diversity in the Boardroom: A Law and Social
Equity Rationale, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 585, 592 (2011) ("Worldview bias may create
misperception of risks on corporate boards and lead to biased corporate decision
making."); id. at 592-93 ("Cultural cognition studies suggest that individuals
conform their assessment of risk to their vision of an ideal society-their cultural
viewpoint or worldview.").
90. See Altria Group, Inc. v. U.S., 694 F. Supp. 2d 259, 269 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
(defining the endowment effect); Abrahamson v. Bd. of Educ. of Wappingers Cent.
Sch. Dist., 01 CIV. 10859 (CM), 2002 WL 1354711 (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 2002)
(discussing "behavioral studies showing that people tend to find it more difficult to
give up money that they are used to receiving than to choose not to receive money
that they do not already have"); J. Thomas Rosch, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n,
Remarks Before the Vienna Competition Conference, Behavioral Economics:
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have criticized the endowment effect as a mistake.9' But the
endowment effect may reflect the normatively defensible
entanglement of personal property with selfhood, a view
associated with Hegel and more recently with Margaret Radin.92
Similarly, a recent Tenth Circuit concurrence by Judge Michael
McConnell treats the endowment effect as providing a reason to
disfavor preliminary injunctions that disturb the status quo,
rather than as a criticizable bias counting against such
injunctions."
4. Bias in Favor of Tradition
The "systematic bias" in favor of tradition may simply be
Burkean conservatism, which sees adherence to tradition as a
mode of respect. Describing deference to tradition as a bias
Observations Regarding Issues That Lie Ahead (June 9, 2010), available at 2010
WL 2382327 at *2 (describing the prevalence of the endowment effect).
91. Jois, supra note 1, at 63 (describing the endowment effect as leading people
to "overvalue existing entitlements"); see also PENN. PUB. UTILITY COMM'N,
INVESTIGATION OF PENNSYLvANIA'S RETAIL ELECTRICITY MARKET: INTERMEDIATE
WORK PLAN (2011), available at 2011 WL 6838044 (describing "status quo bias and
customer inertia, customer behaviors, the changing of which is one of the main
focus areas of this Investigation").
92. See Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, Willingness to Pay vs.
Willingness to Accept: Legal and Economic Implications, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 59, 90
(1993) ("One could also reconstruct prospect theory and the endowment effect as a
new explanation of why WTA exceeds WTP by relying on Margaret Radin's
adaptation of Hegel's theory of property. Radin posited that property may become
bound up with an individual's personality to such an extent that the person regards
the property as part of his self."); see also Darien Shanske, What the Original
Property Tax Revolutionaries Wanted (and It Is Not What You Think), 1 CAL. J.
POL. & POL'Y 1, 9 (reviewing ISAAC WILLIAM MARTIN, THE PERMANENT TAX REVOLT:
How THE PROPERTY TAX TRANSFORMED AMERICAN POLITICS (2008)) ("It is
important to note that the justification that Radin finds in Hegel for the informal
privilege [that protects one's home in a distinctive way] does not simply explain the
informal privilege as a matter of cognitive science (as an example of the
'endowment effect'), but justifies it.").
93. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 973,
1015-16 (10th Cir. 2004) (McConnell, J., concurring), affd and remanded sub nom.
Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006).
94. Compare Jois, supra note 1, at 64 ("[T]he data provide compelling evidence
of humans' tendencies to prefer existing social systems and status quo endowments
and a simultaneous subconscious 'priming' to justify those existing defaults. If this
is true, then the Anglo-American legal system, with its emphasis on stare decisis
and adherence to precedent, exacerbates this human shortcoming."), Korobkin &
Ulen, supra note 74, at 1114-15 ("Like the status quo bias, the power of tradition
results from the utility that individuals derive from conforming to a shared family,
group, or community practice, rather than from the inherent value of a behavior."),
and Marybeth Herald, Transgender Theory: Reprogramming Our Automated
Settings, 28 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 167, 182 (2005) ("The next phase in tackling
gender discrimination must involve the challenging problem of unconscious bias
that limits our openness to new information. Making sure that the information is
53
Law and Inequality
therefore seems to simply talk past the Burkean perspective
rather than normatively engaging it."
5. Epistemic Biases
"[Clonfirmation" biases, which involve excessive confidence
that information corroborates one's own preexisting views, are
often criticized.96 But such biases may simply reflect individuals
giving more weight to their own beliefs merely because they are
their own-an epistemically respectable position." Conversely,
the "expert-deference bias" that Eskridge and Ferejohn criticize
could be interpreted as reasonable epistemic modesty: people
often act appropriately when they defer to expert judgment."
6. Framing Effects and Violations of Rational
Choice
Some have argued that law should be concerned about the
psychological effects of unchosen options, which lead subjects
choosing between options to violate the rational-choice norm that
available is only part of the battle. Courts must also break loose from
straitjacketed views of human intimacy."), with EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON
THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 141 (1790) ("By this unprincipled facility of changing
the state as often, and as much, and in as many ways as there are floating fancies
or fashions, the whole chain and continuity of the commonwealth would be broken.
No one generation could link with the other.").
95. Cf Jois, supra note 1, at 74 (reconstructing Burke as claiming that "the
past ought to be bellowed [sic] not merely because it was probably correct, but also
because failure to do so demonstrated a lack of respect for one's forebears").
96. See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 74, at 1093; see also Ex parte Robbins, 360
S.W.3d 446, 476 n.16 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (Cochran, J., dissenting) ("[F]orensic
scientists must carefully guard against cognitive bias and natural, but scientifically
inappropriate, overconfidence in their scientific opinions."), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct.
2374 (2012).
97. See Adam Elga, Reflection and Disagreement, in SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY:
ESSENTIAL READINGS 158, 165 & n.18 (Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb eds.
2011) (describing and noting adherents of, though not endorsing, what he calls "the
extra weight view, according to which one should give one's own assessment more
weight than the assessments of those one counts as epistemic peers").
98. Compare Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 25, at 622 (worrying that a
committee "might tend to defer to experts" and describing such deference as "the
expert-deference bias"), and id. at 624 (describing conservatives who support stem-
cell research because they "credit the medical researchers who made great claims
for the fruits of the research" as influenced by "expert bias"), with Stephen John,
Expert Testimony and Epistemological Free-Riding: The MMR Controversy, 61
PHIL. Q. 496, 514 (2010) (arguing, in the context of debates about mandatory
childhood vaccination, that "we sometimes have fairness-based reasons to defer to
expert testimony"), and Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual
Due Process, 6 YALE L.J. 1535, 1634-58 (1998) (proposing "a model of rational
epistemic deference to experts").
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irrelevant alternatives should not affect choices." However, the
Nobel Prize economist Amartya Sen persuasively argues that
social norms can make it intelligible and defensible to take
apparently irrelevant alternatives into account.'"' For instance,
etiquette can make it normatively appropriate to take a medium-
sized piece of cake when a large piece is present, but a small piece
when only it and the medium-sized piece are present.'o' Even
though the large piece remains unchosen, it appropriately affects
the choice between alternatives. Sen also observes that an
unchosen option can cast other options in a different light: a law-
abiding citizen may happily attend a new friend's tea party rather
than stay home, but stay home if the friend offers a choice between
a tea party and a cocaine party.'02 And an unchosen option can
affect other options' expressive meaning: fasting and starving
both involve not eating, but fasting requires the availability of
other (unchosen) options.l" These choices, Sen argues, reflect
genuine normative differences rather than normatively irrelevant
"framing effects" of the sort behavioral scientists discuss.'
7. Self-confirming Biases
Finally, some biases may be defensible in cases where what
we believe determines what is true, and having certain beliefs
makes a better outcome true rather than a worse one. This is
because our beliefs about social facts may affect what those facts
turn out to be.
99. Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The
Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 734 (1999) (treating as
worrisome the fact that "the introduction of an irrelevant third option has been
shown to affect the preferences that some individuals have for original options");
see also Gregory Mitchell, Libertarian Paternalism Is an Oxymoron, 99 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1245, 1265 (2004) ("[A]dding a new option to a choice set can cause individuals
to reverse their preferences between options A and B, in violation of the invariance
and dominance axioms.").
100. Amartya Sen, Internal Consistency of Choice, 61 ECONOMETRICA 495, 501
(1993) (discussing how a set of choices are affected by underlying objectives or
values).
101. Id.; see also Bruce Chapman, Rational Choice and Categorical Reason, 151
U. PA. L. REV. 1169, 1177-78 (employing a similar example to Sen's).
102. Sen, supra note 100, at 502.
103. Id.
104. Amartya Sen, Maximization and the Act of Choice, 65 ECONOMETRIcA 745,
752 n.20 (1993) ("The influence of 'framing' arises when essentially the same
decision is presented in different ways, whereas what we are considering here is a
real variation of the decision problem, when a change of the menu from which a
choice is to be made makes a material difference. There is, in fact, no inconsistency
here, only menu dependence of preference rankings.").
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The philosopher Sally Haslanger offers an excellent example
of a self-confirming belief. In the case she discusses, teenage girls'
belief that crop tops are cute does not track an independent reality
about fashion: rather, it makes it the case that crop tops are cute,
because cuteness is a matter of social reality.o' Given that crop
tops are cute because girls believe they are cute, it is accurate for
the girls to go on believing that they are. But it would be better
for the girls to not believe that crop tops are cute, and such a belief
(if widely adopted) would also make itself true.0c So the girls
should not approach the question of what to believe assuming that
their collective evaluation measures a fixed social reality; rather,
they should realize that their collective approach to the question
influences the answer. "7
The economist Glenn Loury makes a similar point to
Haslanger's in discussing racialized evaluations of employees.' If
employers believe that Black workers are likely not to put in much
effort, they are more likely to fire them during the training
period."' But if Black workers are more likely to be fired during
the training period, they have less incentive to work hard during
that period."' This makes the employers' bias against Black
workers empirically justified, but by virtue of the bias's causal
effects rather than its corresponding to an independent reality."'
(Of course, the discriminatory nature of this bias undermines its
normative justification.)
Optimism bias may function like the beliefs Haslanger and
Loury discuss: believing that you are more likely to succeed than
you in fact (absent your beliefs about your own success)
statistically are may influence your likelihood of success."' While
105. Sally Haslanger, But Mom, Crop Tops Are Cute! Social Knowledge, Social
Structure, and Ideology Critique, 17 PHIL. ISSuES 70, 70 (2007).
106. Id. at 73 ("[I]t is true that p so you should believe p; but believing p makes
it true, and it would be better if p weren't true; so you shouldn't believe p.").
107. Id. at 87.
108. GLENN LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY 29-30 (2002).
109. Id. at 30.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 30-31.
112. See Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision
Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499, 1506
(1998) ("Indeed, some biases create self-fulfilling prophecies by prompting others te
[sic] behave in a more favorable fashion. In this sense, using the term irrationality
may convey an unnecessarily pejorative connotation.").
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this might not make the belief factually true ex ante, it might
make optimism bias normatively defensible."'
D. Bias and the Danger of Manipulation
That more than one model of behavior is normatively
defensible does not imply that any model is immune to
manipulation. If a manipulator knows our model of behavior, he
can structure incentives to appeal to us, but this is true both for
behavior in accord with a rational-choice model and for behavior in
accord with other models. Jon Hanson and Douglas Kysar worry
that cognitive deviations from the economic model expose
individuals to manipulation: "because individuals tend to prefer
cooperating with those they view as behaving cooperatively or
fairly, manufacturers will benefit from cultivating an appearance
of cooperation and fairness. . . . irrespective of actual
manufacturer behavior.""' But manufacturers could equally take
advantage of individuals adhering to the economic model, and
thereby seeking low prices, through bait-and-switch advertising."'
Once unscrupulous manufacturers know how we behave, they can
employ deception effectively, regardless of which model of behavior
we adopt.
Nor are the alternative models I suggest immune from
normative criticism. Many, even perhaps most, normatively
reasonable models of human behavior remain subject to normative
criticisms."6 But legal norms do not need to be grounded in
113. Cf Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 74, at 1071 n.66 ("Further, it might be
adaptive for firms to suffer from decision-making biases if such biases are closely
linked to other traits--confidence, optimism, forcefulness, for example-that
provide a competitive advantage."). Note, however, that Korobkin & Ulen are
proposing a prudential (self-interested) justification for optimism bias, not a
normative justification.
114. Id. at 737. For a recent example of what Hanson and Kysar may have
feared, see Koh v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., No. C-09-00927 RMW, 2010 WL 94265,
at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2010), denying motion to dismiss plaintiffs complaint that
defendant engaged in "so-called 'greenwashing,' the practice of making one's
products seem more environmentally friendly than in actuality," by labeling their
products with a misleading "Greenlist" label.
115. See Tashof v. F.T.C., 437 F.2d 707, 709 & n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (affirming
FTC findings that defendant "employed a 'bait and switch' maneuver with respect
to sales of eyeglasses," by advertising glasses for $7.50 but not selling glasses at
that price).
116. For criticism of partiality to friends and intimates, see, for example,
Richard J. Arneson, Consequentialism vs. Special-Ties Partiality, 86 MONIST 382
(2003). For criticism of giving more weight to one's own belief merely on the
ground that it is one's own, see, for example, Elga, supra note 97, at 168. For
criticism of Burkean conservatism, see, for example, David A. Strauss, Tradition,
Precedent, and Justice Scalia, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1699, 1711-12 (1990).
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models immune from criticism; rather, the plausibility of an
alternative model can still be enough to make a legal norm
grounded on that model defensible.
IV. Normatively Unjustifiable Biases
While some conduct that appears biased from one point of
view is consistent with a different but reasonable model of human
behavior, other conduct is inconsistent not only with
experimenters' predictions but with any normatively defensible
model. The influence of biases inconsistent with any defensible
model serves to make a legal practice normatively arbitrary and
thus objectionable. In this Part, I review and discuss some
examples of unjustifiable bias.
A. The Reiteration Effect
"[T]he reiteration effect-where confidence in the truth of an
assertion naturally increases if the assertion is repeated""' may
exemplify an unjustifiable bias. Unlike the view that whether an
action constitutes an act of care is relevant to its normative
evaluation, or the view that fiduciaries have a greater
responsibility than nonfiduciaries, there does not seem to be a
reasonable normative theory or perspective into which the
reiteration effect fits. (We might say that, even though people may
be influenced by the reiteration effect, no one endorses that
influence when making a "considered judgment.""') In most cases,
it is very hard to see how any reasonable model of human behavior
would treat the number of times a claim is repeated as a
legitimate influence on the evaluation of the claim. As such, the
influence of the reiteration effect on, for instance, prosecutors'
decisions about whether to prosecute serves to introduce a lottery
element into the question of whether a given defendant is
prosecuted."' Such a lottery seems contrary to the normative aims
of the justice system.
117. Id.
118. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 42 (rev. ed. 1999) ("Consideredjudgments are simply those rendered under conditions favorable to the exercise of
the sense of justice, and therefore in circumstances where the more common
excuses and explanations for making a mistake do not obtain.").
119. Robert Aronson & Jacqueline McMurtrie, The Use and Misuse of High-Tech
Evidence by Prosecutors: Ethical and Evidentiary Issues, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1453,
1483 (2007) (discussing how the "reiteration effect-where confidence in the truth
of an assertion naturally increases if the assertion is repeated-makes it
increasingly difficult over time for police and prosecutors to consider alternative
perpetrators or theories of a crime").
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The above is not to say that the influence of the reiteration
effect could never be normatively justified. For instance, some
psychologists have argued that basing bets on whether a given
player will win a Wimbledon match simply on whether the player
is known to the bettor (the "recognition heuristic") would lead to a
higher proportion of successful bets than betting based on the
player's ranking or seeding.'20 Perhaps, similarly, in some limited
circumstances where little other information is present, whether
an assertion is repeated could be among the best available
predictors of its truth.2' Were prosecutors in such circumstances,
the reiteration effect might seem normatively acceptable. 2'
However, evidence law frequently directs us to rule out certain
influences on grounds of justice, even if permitting them would
reduce the chance that a guilty person goes free."' This may
reflect a concern that convictions be based on evidence that is
epistemically reliable rather than fortuitously true.
B. Tunnel Vision
The prevalence of "'tunnel vision,' in which investigators and
prosecutors hone their sights on one suspect, and then search for
evidence inculpating him, to the neglect of exculpatory evidence or
the consideration of alternative suspects,""4 seems like reason for
normative concern. While "tunnel vision" commitments could be
normatively defensible outside a legal context-think, for example,
of spousal or parental commitments2-the prosecutorial role, in
contrast to the spousal or parental roles, should not allow such
commitments to individuals."6
120. Sascha Serwe & Christian Frings, Who Will Win Wimbledon? The
Recognition Heuristic in Predicting Sports Events, 19 J. BEHAv. DECIS. MAKING
321, 330 (2006).
121. Id. ("Whenever the recognition heuristic was applicable, nearly all decisions
were consistent with it.").
122. Aronson & McMurtrie, supra note 119, at 1483.
123. See, e.g., John L. Barkai, Accuracy Inquiries for All Felony and
Misdemeanor Pleas: Voluntary Pleas but Innocent Defendants?, 126 U. PA. L. REV.
88, 99 (1977) (arguing that "[t]hrough policy decisions to employ such concepts as
the presumption of innocence, reasonable doubt, burden of proof, and the
exclusionary rules of evidence, the criminal justice system has been designed to
ensure that as many factually innocent defendants as possible will be protected
from conviction, even though those policy decisions result in some factually guilty
defendants being found legally innocent").
124. Burke, supra note 78, at 517.
125. See Harry Frankfurt, The Importance of What We Care About, 53 SYNTHESE
257, 268 (1982).
126. Cf. Feigenson, supra note 83, at 54 ("[N]o acceptable legal or moral theory
makes the similarity of the decision-maker to the litigant or the likability of the
litigant relevant to the substantive justice of the outcome.").
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The normative indefensibility of "tunnel vision" biases in
legal contexts supports a variety of "debiasing" measures,"' in
whose implementation behavioral science can be tremendously
helpful.
C. Discriminatory Bias
As Chamallas's definition of bias"' indicates, biases that
track social categories-such as implicit racial or sex bias-
represent a normatively indefensible form of bias."9 Anthony
Greenwald and Linda Krieger discuss the difference between
discriminatory bias and familiarity bias:
[T]he intuition that biases in favor of one's smaller ingroups
(such as family and friends) are acceptable typically does not
extend to believing that biases favoring one's larger ingroups
(one's race, sex, ethnicity, religion, or age group) are
appropriate. Is there a boundary encompassing ingroups
toward which favorable biases can be considered acceptable?
The illegality of some kinds of biased behavior toward certain
groups (regardless of one's membership)-such as those
defined by race, sex, ethnicit7, religion, and age-provides a
non-psychological boundary.
Implicit associations involving social category membership do
not automatically imply normatively objectionable bias.'
However, when implicit associations correlate with attitudes and
behavior that exacerbates existing patterns of social
disadvantage-such as refusal to hire ethnic and religious
minorities or willingness to shoot unarmed Black men-this
suggests that implicit associations represent part of a normatively
indefensible model of behavior.12'
127. Burke, supra note 78, at 523-28.
128. See infra Part I.
129. Chamallas, supra note 20, at 467.
130. Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 16, at 951.
131. Compare Mitchell & Tetlock, supra note 19, at 1072-90 (suggesting that
implicit associations between racial minorities and negative terms may not
translate into negative attitudes toward minorities, but instead may reflect
sympathy with minorities, the greater salience of outgroup members, differences in
cognitive processing speed, or implicit recognition of cultural and societal
associations between minorities and negative terms), with Jerry Kang & Kristin
Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the Law, 58 UCLA L. REV.
465, 479-81 (2010) (criticizing these and other alternative explanations of implicit
associations).
132. Kang & Lane, supra note 131, at 481-90 (collecting evidence that implicit
associations correlate with these and other examples of discriminatory behavior).
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D. Environmental Priming
Other examples of unjustifiable bias may include the effect of
holding a hot or cold cup of coffee on judgments of interpersonal
warmth or friendliness, 33 and the effect of judges' hunger and
exhaustion levels on parole decisions.' Particularly given the
effect size of the last result, the importance of the decision at
stake, and the apparent normative irrelevance of the biasing
factor, the studies appear to provide a strong case for a debiasing
intervention. (However, behavioral scientists are currently
debating the scientific validity of "priming" studies like the above
in light of concerns about their replicability."')
V. Unjustifiable Bias as Negligence
Should we blame legal decision makers whose decisions
reflect the influence of an unjustifiable bias? Alafair Burke argues
that "a discursive shift toward a cognitive explanation for
prosecutorial decision making" should lead us not to fault
prosecutors for their bias-influenced decisions.'" I am
unpersuaded. If prosecutors are-or should be-aware of the
influence of normatively unjustified biases on their decision
making, and if they could either de-bias themselves or resign to
allow less biased prosecutors to take over, they are culpable to
some degree when their biased decisions lead to the conviction of
innocent defendants. As such, the "narrative trend that
increasingly depicts prosecutors as victims of cognitive accidents
133. Lawrence E. Williams & John A. Bargh, Experiencing Physical Warmth
Promotes Interpersonal Warmth, 322 SCI. 606, 606 (2008); see also Curtis E.A.
Karnow, Similarity in Legal Analysis and the Post-Literate Blitz, 15 GREEN BAG 2D
243, 250 (2012) (citing Williams & Bargh, supra) ("We associate the warmth of a
hot drink with warm people and so like people better when we hold a warm cup of
coffee, but we must reject mere association as a basis for decision.").
134. Shai Danziger, Jonathan Levav & Liora Avnaim-Pesso, Extraneous Factors
in Judicial Decisions, 108 PNAS 6889, 6890 (2011) ("We find that the likelihood of a
favorable ruling is greater at the very beginning of the work day or after a food
break than later in the sequence of cases."); see also Zoe Corbyn, Hungry Judges
Dispense Rough Justice, NATURE NEWS (Apr. 11, 2011),
www.nature.com/news/2011/110411/full/news.2011.227.html (reporting a statement
by Prof. Robert MacCoun of UC Berkeley that this result is "a particularly striking
one because the biasing factor is seemingly innocuous and so patently irrelevant to
the case at hand" and a statement by Prof. Jeffrey Rachlinski of Cornell University
worrying about the technical soundness of the study procedure).
135. See, e.g., Alison Abbott, Disputed Results a Fresh Blow for Social
Psychology, NATURE NEWs (Apr. 30, 2013), http://www.nature.com/news/disputed-
results-a-fresh-blow-for-social-psychology-1.12902 (reporting concerns of Nobel
Prize behavioral scientist Daniel Kahneman and others about "a growing number
of failures to replicate results").
136. Burke, supra note 78, at 515.
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as opposed to purposeful or reckless wrongdoers""7 is
oversimplified. The law recognizes at least one level of mens rea-
negligence-between reasonable conduct and intentional
wrongdoing. If a driver is aware, or should be aware, that driving
after drinking alcohol will greatly increase the likelihood of a car
accident, he is not an innocent victim of the accident: rather, he is
culpable even though he is not a purposeful (and perhaps not even
a reckless) wrongdoer."3 "Cognitive accidents" are no different.
While it may be helpful to distinguish negligence as a result of
uncorrected bias from intentional wrongdoing, negligence is still a
basis for fault.'39
Whether biased prosecutors deserve blame raises the further
question of whether an inappropriate decision that stems from a
cognitive bias is better or worse than an inappropriate decision
that stems from an actively invidious influence, such as conscious
racism. Conscious racism seems to involve a more serious form of
disrespect than unconscious bias does. However, invidious
unconscious bias may be particularly troubling because its
operation is not apparent to the biased actor. This may make it
more difficult to ameliorate.14
137. Id.
138. E.g., Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 145 (2008) (noting that "[t]he
conduct for which the drunk driver is convicted (driving under the influence) need
not be purposeful or deliberate" and crediting dissenting circuit judge's observation
in the case under appeal that "drunk driving is a crime of negligence or
recklessness, rather than violence or aggression"); Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11
(2004) (noting the "merely accidental or negligent conduct involved in a DUI
offense").
139. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive
Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L.
REV. 1161, 1245 (1995) ("[Slocial cognition theory suggests that the
nondiscrimination principle would be more effective in reducing intergroup bias
were it understood as prescriptive duty to identify and control for errors in social
perception and judgment which inevitably occur, even among the well-intended.
Accordingly, I agree with David Oppenheimer's suggestions that a negligence
approach to discrimination and equal employment opportunity would further
Title VII's purpose.").
140. See State v. Rose, 46 A.3d 146, 156 (Conn. 2012) ("[A] defendant's
appearance in identifiable prison clothing does something substantially worse than
inject improper evidence into the case, namely, it causes jurors to deliberate under
a cognitive bias. Because this bias is subtle and ever present, jury instructions may
not be adequate to cure it."); see also Nathan A. Frazier, Amending for Justice's
Sake: Codified Disclosure Rule Needed to Provide Guidance to Prosecutor's Duty to
Disclose, 63 FLA. L. REv. 771, 799-800 (2011) ("Unlike other causes of prosecutorial
non-disclosure, cognitive bias arguably poses the most serious threat to the
criminal justice system because it not only affects every single prosecutor, but more
importantly, human awareness alone cannot eliminate its presence.").
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Conclusion
I hope in this Article to have illuminated some useful
distinctions between different definitions of bias, and to have
differentiated some justifiable biases from unjustifiable ones. I
also hope to have shown that the normative implications of
cognitive bias are more complex than they might have initially
seemed. I conclude by focusing on this last point.
Many who consider the normative implications of cognitive
bias seem to assume that decisions or actions influenced (or, at
least, substantially influenced) by a cognitive bias are normatively
criticizable or endorsable on that basis alone. Matthew Adler
suggests that behavioral scientists Daniel Kahneman and Amos
Tversky fall into this category: "Tversky, Kahneman and others
working in this tradition generally seem to see the heuristics and
biases they identify as departures from rationality-as deviations
from the true norms of choice, embodied in [decision theory], and
the true norms of judgment, embodied in probability theory.""'
Adler observes, however, that "prospect-theoretic choice, and
probability judgments driven by representativeness, availability,
or anchoring and adjustment, could really be part of the correct
procedural component of the correct normative framework,
whatever Tversky and Kahneman think."14' And, indeed, as Adler
observes, Gerd Gigerenzer seems to believe that prospect theory is
part of the correct normative framework."
However, I would suggest that Gigerenzer, Kahneman, and
Tversky are all mistaken to the extent that they treat the
influence of a heuristic or bias as in itself relevant to the
normative evaluation of a practice. Rather, that a legal practice
involves employing a heuristic neither reliably counts for or
against that practice. (And, I suspect-contrary to the hopes or
fears of some-a legal norm's connection with a heuristic or bias
does not reliably entail a connection with a political viewpoint.'"
141. Matthew D. Adler, Bounded Rationality and Legal Scholarship, in
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 137, 150 (Mark D. White ed.,
2008).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 152 ("A body of recent work on bounded rationality has focused on
'noncompensatory' heuristics. Much of this scholarship has been undertaken by
Gerd Gigerenzer, who is notable for his endorsement of heuristics as rational. He
sees their use, not as a deviation from rationality, but as a rational response to
computational demands.").
144. Compare Hoffman, supra note 3, at 528 (worrying that behavioralists'
attempts to reach normative conclusions "rely on a conception of the Rule of Law
which has been statistically proven to be more appealing to white men than to
minorities and women"), and Adler, supra note 141, at 141 (worrying that the
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For instance, conservative Justice Clarence Thomas rejects the
very stare decisis norm that situationist scholars allege reflects
conservatism.") Instead, the normative evaluation of a heuristic's
or bias's use depends on its connection with some reasonable
normative perspective, where reasonableness may in turn depend
on an "overlapping consensus" of the reasonable normative
theories.""
I am not rejecting the possibility that heuristics and biases
can be normatively criticizable or endorsable."' What I am
arguing is that these criticisms or endorsements must come by
way of normative argument: behavioral science does not and
cannot show on its own that biases or heuristics are either
desirable or objectionable.'" Discussions of cognitive bias must do
behavioral scholarship of Cass Sunstein and others gives corporations a strategic
advantage over ordinary citizens), with Adam Benforado & Jon Hanson, The Great
Attributional Divide: How Divergent Views of Human Behavior are Shaping Legal
Policy, 57 EMORY L.J. 311, 315 n.3 (2008) (stating that
"situationism ... understands that the naive psychology ... undergirding our laws
and institutions is largely inaccurate" and noting the near-identity between
situationism and "behavioral realism"), and id. at 383 ("This section argues that a
major part of what it means to call a person 'liberal' is to designate that individual
as relatively sensitive to situation. And, conversely, the label 'conservative' is often
meant to designate a person as relatively dispositionist.").
145. Compare Jois, supra note 1, at 8 (arguing that stare decisis is conservative),
with CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALs IN ROBES 76 (2005) (quoting Justice Scalia's
claim that Justice Thomas rejects stare decisis).
146. See RAWLS, supra note 118, at 340 (defining an "overlapping consensus" as
arising when multiple reasonable normative perspectives stably endorse a set of
values).
147. Cf Hoffman, supra note 3, at 512-13 (describing scholars who conclude
"that there is no way to distinguish rational from irrational behavior-both words
essentially state conclusions based on the speaker's perspective of how people
should act").
148. See Andrew B. Coan, Response and Reply, Well, Should They? A Response
to If People Would Be Outraged by Their Rulings, Should Judges Care? 60 STAN. L.
REV. 213, 230 n.83 (2007) ("It should be emphasized that [cascades and systematic
biases] are not, by definition, pejorative terms. There are good cascades, and even
good systematic biases, but they must be assessed as such on the merits."); see also
Feigenson, supra note 83, at 50 ("It can be argued that partiality in itself does not
necessarily make decisions unjust, if the bias in question is one of which we
approve. Sympathy would remain a worthwhile component of legal judgment if it
biased decisions in ways that match legally or morally acceptable grounds to prefer
one outcome to another. Difficulties would arise only if sympathy biased judgment
in ways we consider unfair."); id. at 64 ("In sum, sympathy biases person-judgment
favorably to the object of sympathy. This alone does not make sympathetic judging
objectionable, if the bias were one we would accept on legal or moral
grounds."). My denial that biases are good or bad in themselves makes me
sympathetic with the Cultural Cognition Project's approach (at least on Adam
Benforado's reconstruction) rather than either the perspective of Benforado and his
colleagues or the perspective Benforado identifies with the "Naive Realist." See
Adam Benforado, Frames of Injustice: The Bias We Overlook, 85 IND. L.J. 1333,
1346 (2010) (noting that for the Cultural Cognition Project, "different attributions
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more than offer a promissory note to support their normative
conclusions or to reject alternatives."' And without normative
foundations, more empirical work will not solve the problem.5 o
Some might look to another branch of science in search of a
basis for endorsing heuristics that does not rest on normative
theory-perhaps our evolutionary makeup entails that we cannot
help but employ, and therefore should normatively endorse,
certain intuitive heuristics.' John Mikhail edges close to making
such a claim when he chides Richard Posner for ignoring the
"hypothesis of many cognitive scientists that the sense of justice is
one cognitive domain where 'children look like geniuses, knowing
simply reflect different shared identities," whereas for Benforado et al. and the
Naive Realist, attributions are "accurate" to the extent they reflect a situationist
model (Benforado et al.) or "our own" attributions (the Naive Realist)); see also Dan
M. Kahan et al., Fear of Democracy: A Cultural Evaluation of Sunstein on Risk, 119
HARV. L. REV. 1071, 1073 (2006) ("If risk disputes are really disputes over the good
life, then the challenge that risk regulation poses for democracy is less how to
reconcile public sensibilities with science than how to accommodate diverse visions
of the good within a popular system of regulation."); Burch, supra note 89, at 613
("A normative implication is that not all risk variation is risk bias to be mitigated.
'If fact and value are intertwined, then cultural cognition is not bias-it is moral
perception.'" (quoting Dan Kahan, The Cultural Cognition ofRisk: Theory, Evidence
and Implications, WALTER INST.:
THE CULTURAL COGNITION PROJECT AT YALE L. SCH.
(Oct. 8, 2009), http://mediasite.video.ufl.edulMediasite/Playel6374d0980344fa9112
66bf40b60314)).
149. See Hoffman, supra note 3, at 528-29 (describing behaviorists' failure to
support the move from empirical claims to a normative conclusion); Coan, supra
note 148, at 225 n.58 ("Sunstein suggests that [perhaps judges'] ... theory of
interpretation permits them to 'consider certain judgments to be "biases" in a
constitutionally relevant sense.' But this is not just a way around the problem of
judicial cognitive bias, it is a way around the whole epistemic argument. The
theory of interpretation is doing all the work." (citation omitted)).
150. See Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist
Revision of "Affirmative Action," 94 CAL. L. REV. 1063, 1065 (2006)
("We ... recognize that empirical findings cannot replace values, and by
themselves, do not dictate any single course of action."). Jolls et al., supra note 28,
thus miss the point when they attempt to respond to Kelman's normative critique
with a call for more empirical work: "Kelman is right to emphasize the importance
of sorting out possible alternative explanations and of understanding what kinds of
effects are at work in different settings. Our basic point is that we have important
empirical issues here, and no reason to think that we are left only with
'interpretive tropes' or 'dances.' Dancing has its place, but in this context, people
should stop dancing and get to work." Id. at 1607.
151. E.g., MARC HAUSER, MORAL MINDS, at xx (2006) ("It is clear that in the
arena of medicine, as in so many other areas where moral conflicts arise, the policy
wonks and politicians should listen more closely to our intuitions and write policy
that effectively takes into account the moral voice of our species."). Although many
of Hauser's empirical results proved to have been based on fabricated data, see
Findings of Research Misconduct, 77 Fed. Reg. 54,917-18 (Sept. 6, 2012), his
normative claim here does not appear to directly rely on those results.
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things they have not been taught.'""' But what Mikhail overlooks
is that whether children look like moral geniuses or moral
incompetents depends on which moral arguments we endorse.
That children adhere to a nonconsequentialist "universal moral
grammar""' gives Posner no reason to abandon his
consequentialist law-and-economics stance, unless Posner also
accepts the additional-and implausible-normative principle that
children's adoption of a set of moral principles gives others
normative reason to endorse the same principles.
Meanwhile, if Mikhail is right that adults inescapably act in
accord with universal moral principles, this may be more
relevant-assuming an "ought implies can" hypothesis-to choices
about legal norms.'" But such a finding still would not end the
debate. As the distinguished political philosopher G.A. Cohen
argued, a norm (e.g., rewarding greater talent with higher income)
can still be unjust even if it is the only norm consistent with
inescapable and universal features of human psychology (e.g., our
inability to work hard without incentives)."' Mikhail's universal
moral grammar might therefore reflect a universal feature of
human nature without thereby being normatively correct. Cohen's
argument offers a basis for a law-and-economics sympathist like
Posner to criticize Mikhail's conclusion even if Mikhail's universal
moral grammar proves universal in practice."6 Even were Posner
himself to act in accordance with Mikhail's postulated principles-
152. John Mikhail, Law, Science, and Morality: A Review of Richard Posner's
The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1057, 1097 (2002)
(quoting STEVEN PINKER, THE LANGUAGE INSTINCT 419 (1994)).
153. Id. at 1088.
154. Cf Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 25, at 625 n.33 ("There is a special
sense in which cognitive science may contribute to criticizing the ends of
governmental policies. Insofar as the Kantian slogan[-ought implies can[-]is
accepted, cognitive psychology may show that some governmental ends are
impermissible because agencies cannot administer means to achieve them (because
of cognitive biases). Such a demonstration would be exceedingly difficult, however,
because it entails evaluation of all possible means to reach the end in question.").
155. G.A. COHEN, RESCUING JUSTICE AND EQUALITY 155 (2008) (denying that an
"insurmountable" inability could not be a cause of injustice and instead holding
that "even an unavoidable inequality remains unjust" if the inequality has a
"morally arbitrary" cause). Cohen's argument therefore denies the Kantian ought-
implies-can slogan that Eskridge and Ferejohn discuss, supra note 154. David
Estlund offers a similar argument in Human Nature and the Limits (If Any) of
Political Philosophy, 39 PHIL. PUB. AFF. 207, 208 (2011), rejecting the view that "[a]
normative political theory is defective and thus false if it imposes standards or
requirements that ignore human nature-that is, requirements that will not, owing
to human nature and the motivational incapacities it entails, ever be satis*ed."
156. This is itself interesting, given that Posner and Cohen could hardly be
further apart in their beliefs about justice in general and distributive justice in
particular.
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as he would if they were truly universal-he might still reject
these principles' status as moral norms.
That cognitive heuristics and biases, as such, are neither
reliably endorsable nor reliably rejectable should ultimately be
unsurprising. Notwithstanding our divergent views about stare
decisis or risk regulation, we have all abandoned-or at least we
should abandon-the Cartesian belief that our decisions issue
from some unearthly realm." That our decisions are subject to
myriad physical, psychological, and neurological influences both
from within and without should neither reassure nor disturb us:
on one very plausible view, we can be fully and robustly
responsible for our decisions even while those decisions are the
product of internal and external influences.'" Being reassured or
disturbed requires answering a further, normative question:
which influences are normatively defensible, and which are
normatively corrosive? Once we have a preliminary answer to the
normative question, behavioral science can help us design norms
that emphasize the defensible influences and avoid the corrosive
ones.60 But behavioral scientists, though they can describe how
we reason about the normative question, have no special expertise
in answering it.16' That question we must answer for ourselves.
157. I am grateful to Adam Kolber for prompting this clarification.
158. Cf Stephen Morse, Brain Overclaim Syndrome and Criminal
Responsibility: A Diagnostic Note, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 397, 405 (2006) ("The
discovery that the brain, including a brain abnormality, played some causal role in
the production of what is undeniably human action does not lead to any legal
conclusions about responsibility."); see also Selim Berker, The Normative
Insignificance of Neuroscience, 37 PHIL. PUB. AFF. 293, 327 (2009) ("The appeal to
neuroscience provides no new traction on this old debate [between
consequentialists and nonconsequentialists]."). Contra Martin & Tama y Sweet,
supra note 1, at 528-29 (appealing to neuroscientific research to justify claims
about cognitive bias).
159. Cf Mark Kelman, Law and Behavioral Science: Conceptual Overviews, 97
Nw. U. L. REV. 1347, 1386 (2003) ("Few people who believe in individual
responsibility for choice will find the social psychology literature nearly as
unsettling as the psychologists believe it should be. At the general level, most
people who believe in blaming acknowledge the notion that the behavior an
individual manifests is in some sense a product of circumstances.").
160. Here I agree with Ferejohn and Eskridge, supra note 25, at 625: "(recall
that we do not believe cognitive psychology makes an independent contribution to
thought about the overall norm against which government decisions ought to be
measured. Its contribution is not to thinking about the ends of politics, but rather
to thinking about the means by which decisions are reached."
161. Cf Kysar, supra note 9, at 195 ("Because such a task [i.e. establishing a
normative benchmark for good decision making] is not normally thought of as the
proper province of social science, it is therefore important to distinguish between
positive and normative uses of psychology and experimental economics. Conflating
the two may lead both to bad science and to bad policy.").
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